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I. INTRODUCTION
Reapportionment' and redistricting 2 of the State Legislature are
initially and predominantly functions of the State Legislature.3 These tasks
are accomplished by article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution which
requires the participation of each of the three branches of government.4 On
1. "Reapportionment" is the redistribution of the number of legislative seats. See FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 16(a). For example, the decision as to how many legislative seats to have
within the 30-40 senatorial districts and the 80-120 representative districts allowed under
article III, section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution is a reapportionment decision. See id.
2. "Redistricting" is the redrawing of district lines or boundaries once the number of
district seats is determined. In this article, reapportioning and redistricting will be used inter-
changeably, with emphasis on the redistricting process.
3. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its
legislature or other body." Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975).
4. The primary responsibility resides with the State Legislature to enact a redistricting
plan. See FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 16(c). The Attorney General must submit the plan to the
Supreme Court of Florida for a declaratory judgment determining its validity. Id. The
Governor's role is to call for extraordinary legislative sessions when the court finds the
redistricting plan to be invalid. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 16(d).
The constitutional provision reads as follows:
Section 16. Legislative apportionment.-
(a) SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. The legislature
at its regular session in the second year following each decennial census, by joint
resolution, shall apportion the state in accordance with the constitution of the
state and of the United States into not less than thirty nor more than forty
consecutively numbered senatorial districts of either contiguous, overlapping or
identical territory, and into not less than eighty nor more than one hundred
twenty consecutively numbered representative districts of either contiguous,
overlapping or identical territory. Should that session adjourn without adopting
such joint resolution, the governor by proclamation shall reconvene the
legislature within thirty days in special apportionment session which shall not
exceed thirty consecutive days, during which no other business shall be
transacted, and it shall be the mandatory duty of the legislature to adopt a joint
resolution of apportionment.
(b) FAILURE OF LEGISLATURE TO APPORTION; JUDICIAL REAPPOR-
TIONMENT. In the event a special apportionment session of the legislature
finally adjourns without adopting a joint resolution of apportionment, the
attorney general shall, within five days, petition the supreme court of the state
to make such apportionment. No later than the sixtieth day after the filing of
such petition, the supreme court shall file with the secretary of state an order
making such apportionment.
(c) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF APPORTIONMENT. Within fifteen days after
the passage of the joint resolution of apportionment, the attorney general shall
petition the supreme court of the state for a declaratory judgment determining
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three separate occasions during 1972, 1982, and 1992, this section served
as the procedural framework for redistricting the Florida Senate and House
of Representatives. However, as the contentious 1992 redistricting effort
graphically demonstrates, this constitutional provision does not eliminate the
partisan politics that permeate the process.
As a result of the politically divisive 1992 legislative struggle over the
redistricting of the State Legislature, efforts were undertaken during the
1993 legislative session to alter or eliminate this constitutional procedure
which maximizes government involvement by requiring participation by all
three branches of state government. Proposals were made to either replace
the present system with an appointed commission, or involve such a
commission with legislative efforts. Although these proposals did not pass,
the seeds of change appear to have been planted by the discord of 1992.
To understand how the state has gotten to this point after only three
redistricting experiences, it is necessary to examine the genesis of this
constitutional provision, study its procedural and substantive requirements
with particular emphasis on federal law considerations, trace its operation
the validity of the apportionment. The supreme court, in accordance with its
rules, shall permit adversary interests to present their views and, within thirty
days firom the filing of the petition, shall enter its judgment.
(d) EFFECT OF JUDGMENT IN APPORTIONMENT; EXTRAORDINARY
APPORTIONMENT SESSION. A judgment of the supreme court of the state
determining the apportionment to be valid shall be binding upon all the citizens
of the state. Should the supreme court determine that the apportionment made
by the legislature is invalid, the governor by proclamation shall reconvene the
legislature within five days thereafter in extraordinary apportionment session
which shall not exceed fifteen days, during which the legislature shall adopt a
joint resolution of apportionment conforming to the judgment of the supreme
court.
(e) EXTRAORDINARY APPORTIONMENT SESSION; REVIEW OF
APPORTIONMENT. Within fifteen days after the adjournment of an
extraordinary apportionment session, the attorney general shall file a petition in
the supreme court of the state setting forth the apportionment resolution adopted
by the legislature, or if none has been adopted reporting that fact to the court.
Consideration of the validity of ajoint resolution of apportionment shall be had
as provided for in cases of such joint resolution adopted at a regular or special
apportionment session.
(f) JUDICIAL REAPPORTIONMENT. Should an extraordinary apportion-
ment session fail to adopt a resolution of apportionment or should the supreme
court determine that the apportionment made is invalid, the court shall, not later
than sixty days after receiving the petition of the attorney general, file with the
secretary of state an order making such apportionment.
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during 1972 and 1982, explore the contentious 1992 redistricting battle, and
then look at proposed changes to see if they might improve upon the
existing provision.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF REDISTRICTING IN FLORIDA
A. The Former Provisions
Florida Constitution, article III, section 16 is a product of the 1965
Florida Constitution Revision Commission's efforts which ultimately led to
the present Florida Constitution, adopted by the voters in 1968. The
Commission's work on the legislative redistricting provision, however, had
its roots in the United States Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr.5
In Baker, the Court tossed the lower courts into a "political thicket"6 by
holding that legislative redistricting presented a justiciable issue.' Ensuing
litigation challenged Florida's legislative districts as being malapportioned.8
The history of redistricting litigation in Florida is a study of the rapid
migration into, and urbanization of, a state that had been traditionally
controlled politically by rural interests. The explosive urban growth that
began in the 1950's came at a time when minorities, particularly Blacks,
were seeking, and to some degree realizing, a greater voice in the political
processes. This stronger minority voice can be seen in the United States Su-
preme Court desegregation decisions of the mid-1950's 9 and the passage of
both the Civil Rights Act ° and Voting Rights Act" in the mid-1960's.
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
7. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
8. These cases are commonly referred to as the Swann litigation. See Sobel v. Adams,
208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Sobel v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Fla. 1963), rev'd
sub nom. Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Swann v. Adam, 383 U.S. 210 (1966);
Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev d, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Swann v.
Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See also In re Apportionment Law Appearing
As Senate Joint Resolution I E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1048
(Fla. 1982).
"Malapportionment" is the inequitable distribution of legislative seats created either by
the failure to reapportion at regular intervals based on population formula, or by the use of
a population formula that discriminates against a group or geographical area of the state.
Both practices are illegal under Baker and its progeny.
9. See, for example, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and its progeny.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
11. Id. § 1973.
1004 [Vol. 18
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/10
Waas
Each Florida redistricting case represents a microcosm of the population
shift from rural to urban domination and the attendant emergence of
minorities toward becoming a potent political focus, all reflected in the
battle for legislative power.
Prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, the provision controlling
legislative redistricting was article VII, section 3 of the 1885 Constitution
which required legislative districts
to be as nearly equal in population as practicable, but no county shall
be divided in making such apportionment, and each District shall have
one Senator; and, at the same time, the Legislature shall also apportion
the Representation in the House of Representatives, and shall allow
three (3) Representatives to each of the five most populous counties,
and two (2) Representatives to each of the next eighteen more populous
counties, and one Representative to each of the remaining counties of
the State at the time of such apportionment. 2
Thus, as demonstrated in Sobel v. Adams, a relatively small number of
voters could elect a majority of the Legislature:
Each of the three representatives in the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives from Dade County, the most populous county in the State,
represents the equivalent of 311,000 people according to the 1960
Federal census. The member from Gilchrist, the least populous county,
would represent 2,868 residents. The five most populous counties
12. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VII, § 3. The 1885 constitutional provision called for 38
Senate districts. Id. Prior to 1885, redistricting was governed by article IX of the Florida
Constitutions of 1838, 1861, 1865 and article XIII of the Florida Constitution of 1868.
The 1838, 1861, and 1865 Constitutions provided for one representative for each
county, with increases in the number of representatives based on a uniform population ratio,
which would remain in place until a new census was taken. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX,
§ I; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 1. The Senate was
not to be less than one-fourth nor more than one-half the number of representatives. FLA.
CONsT. of 1838, art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art.
IX, § 2.
The 1868 Constitution gave each county one representative, plus an additional
representative for each 1000 registered voters, up to a maximum of four for any county.
FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI1I, § I. The Senate remained essentially unchanged. See 25A
FLA. STAT. ANN. 672 (West 1991) (annot. to FLA. CONST. art XII, § 10). The 1885
Constitution, as amended in 1950, provided that the official federal census would be the
official Florida census upon which the Legislature would rely. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art.
VII, § 5 (1950). Prior to this amendment, the 1885 Constitution required the Legislature to
enumerate by county all of the state's inhabitants. Id.
1994] 1005
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average one representative for each 106,000 people. The five least
populous counties average one representative for each 3,266 people.
The membership of the Florida Senate, considered on a basis of
representation of numbers, would show a similar disparity between the
more populous and the less populous areas.13
The three-judge court 4 in Sobel, considering a constitutional challenge
based on urban-rural population inequality as opposed to pure race-based
variance, found the 1962 redistricting plan before it invidiously discrimina-
tory and contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but gave the Legislature the opportunity to remedy the violation. 5
The federal court, upon reviewing the Legislature's new plan, proceeded to
validate it.'6 On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirements of the use of population as a basis for redistricting and
permitting deviations only if supported by legitimate considerations
implicating rational state policies as set out in Reynolds v. Sims. 7
On remand, the federal district court deferred action until after the
1965 legislative session, during which the Legislature adopted another
redistricting plan. 8 The district court held that the new plan did not meet
constitutional requirements; however, the plan would be implemented on an
interim basis expiring sixty days after adjournment of the 1967 legislative
session.' 9 The United States Supreme Court, finding no basis for allowing
interim implementation of an unconstitutional malapportioned plan, reversed
the district court and remanded the cause for the purpose of effectuating a
valid plan for the 1966 elections.2"
In March, 1966, the Legislature adopted yet another plan which
provided for multi-member districts with population deviations in the Senate
in excess of twenty-six percent and in the House in excess of thirty-four
percent." The United States Supreme Court once again invalidated the
13. Sobel, 208 F. Supp. at 317.
14. Litigation challenging any statewide legislative redistricting is heard by athree-judge
federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988).
15. Sobel, 208 F. Supp. at 318-19.
16. Sobel, 214 F. Supp. at 812.
17. See Swann, 378 U.S. at 553; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
18. Sobel, 258 F. Supp. at 820.
19. Id. at 822.
20. Swann, 383 U.S. at 211-12.
21. See Sobel, 258 F. Supp. at 826. As demonstrated herein, Florida Constitution article
11I, section 16 requires redistricting in conformity with the Federal Constitution. Population
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plan because the state had not justified these deviations on rational state
policy grounds.22 On remand, the district court, finding Florida's plan
constitutionally infirm, took it upon itself to redistrict the State into forty-
eight Senate districts and 119 House districts.23 The 1968 Constitution
Revision Commission wanted to avoid further litigation by providing a
mechanism for ultimate judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court.24
During its deliberations, the Commission's main focus was on the impor-
tance of the one person, one vote principle, as well as the contiguity and
relative size of districts.2"
B. The Current Provision
1. Overview of Substantive Considerations
Florida Constitution, article III, section 16 was born of this five-year
litigation chronology and requires the Legislature, by joint resolution not
subject to gubernatorial veto, to reapportion the state into not less than thirty
nor more than forty senatorial districts, and into not less than eighty nor
more than 120 representative districts, in accordance with both the state and
Federal Constitutions.2' This must be accomplished during the regular
session of the Legislature convened "in the second year following each
decennial census."27  The provision further requires that both Houses
consist of "consecutively numbered . . . districts of either contiguous,
overlapping or identical territory. 28  "Contiguous" means sharing a
deviation is a factor in the one person, one vote mandate. Population deviation is the
difference between a district's actual population, and the "ideal" population determined by
dividing the total state population by the number of districts. For example, if a state has a
population of 10,000,000 and a 100-seat legislative body, the ideal population district is
10,000,000 divided by 100 or 100,000.
22. Swann, 385 U.S. at 573.
23. Swann, 263 F. Supp. at 226. The court further held that the term of office for those
elected under this plan would expire with the 1968 general elections. Id. at 228.
24. See Constitution Revision Commission Convention Proceedings, 11-28-66 to 1-7-67,
Vol. 22 Series 722.
25. Id.
26. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 16(a).
27. Id. The decennial census is conducted in every year ending in zero. See 13 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1988). The Florida Constitution provides that "[e]ach decennial census of the state
taken by the United States shall be an official census of the state" and "become(s) effective
on the thirtieth day after the final adjournment of the regular session of the legislature
convened next after certification of the census." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
28. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a).
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common boundary for a reasonably significant distance; "overlapping"
means sharing some of the territory of two districts; "identical" means two
districts following the same lines.29
The state constitutional requirement that redistricting be accomplished
in accordance with the Federal Constitution necessitates inquiry of the one
person, one vote principle. Specifically, population deviation, the profound
implications of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, political
gerrymandering and other federally recognized factors have to be considered
in the process.
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2 governs appor-
tionment of the United States House of Representatives and requires that
redistricting of that body be approached with the objective of achieving zero
deviation from population equality.3" The ideal district population is
determined by dividing the state's total population by the number of seats
assigned to the state. 31 A state's total deviation is determined by adding
the percentage above the ideal population of the largest district and the
percentage below the ideal population of the smallest district. The United
States Supreme Court, in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,32 held that there is no
point at which population deviations become de minimis or insignificant for
congressional reapportionment; states are required to make a good faith
effort to achieve mathematical equality.33  Any deviation from precise
mathematical equality with regard to congressional redistricting is examined
with a jaundiced eye. Only where population variances are unavoidable
despite a good faith effort to achieve zero deviation, or where there is a
compelling justification for the deviation, will the court accept such
variances. 4
While the Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 2 controls congres-
sional reapportionment and redistricting, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to state legislative realignment. In Reynolds
29. See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, 1982
Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 1982). These considerations
are addressed further in part III of this article.
30. See U.S. CONST. art i, § 2; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
31. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 528. Congressional districts are all single-member. 2
U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988). By the 1990 census, Florida was accorded 23 congressional districts.
32. 394 U.S. at 526.
33. Id. at 530-31.
34. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973). Population variance is determined by
taking the difference between a district's actual population and ideal population, and dividing
that number by the ideal population. This results in the percentage proportion by which a
district's population exceeds or is below the ideal population.
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v. Sims,35 the Court recognized that the Equal Protection Clause provides
for more flexibility with respect to state legislative apportionment.36
However, states are still required to make an honest and good faith effort to
draw districts as near to equal population as is practical.37 The Reynolds
Court recognized that mathematical exactness or precision is not necessarily
a workable constitutional requirement in the state legislative process, and
that some deviations are constitutionally permissible so long as the variances
from a strict population standard are based on legitimate state policy consid-
eration.38 The Court cautioned, however, that even where there may be
rational state policy considerations for population deviations among the
several legislative districts, population is still the controlling consideration,
and population equality the ultimate goal.39
The Reynolds Court declined to spell out any precise constitutional test
for population variance propriety, deciding instead to consider each case on
its particular factual basis. However, the Court, in Mahan v. Howell,
40
suggested the outer limits of allowable population variation among
legislative districts when it held that a 16.4% variation did not exceed the
limits under which equal protection would be satisfied. However, the Court
cautioned that its view was limited to the particular and complex facts of
that case.4' In Connor v. Finch42 and Chapman v. Meier,43 the Court
held that variations of sixteen to twenty percent were constitutionally
unacceptable.44
In White v. Register45 and Gaffney v. Cummings,46 the Court held
that population deviations of less than ten percent were ipsofacto acceptable
as de minimis in the face of a challenge of invidious discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47
Through the 1982 redistricting process, minorities claiming that their
respective voting power was negated or diluted as a result of skewed
35. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. Id. at 578.
37. Id. at 577.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 567.
40. 410 U.S. 315, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
41. Id.
42. 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
43. 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
44. Connor, 431 U.S. at 417; Chapman, 420 U.S. at 24.
45. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
46. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
47. Id.; White, 412 U.S. at 764.
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boundary lines had to rely on the Voting Rights Act of 196548 and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, all
of which required a showing of purposeful discriminatory intent.49 This
intent requirement spurred Congress to amend the Voting Rights Act by
eliminating a showing of intent and imposing a results standard which
allows affected minorities to prove a violation of federal law by establishing
that they did not have an equal opportunity to "participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice" as a result of a voting
practice or procedure, including a legislative redistricting plan." The 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act were first considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles5" which involved a chal-
lenge to legislative redistricting plans in North Carolina calling for one
multi-member senate district, one single-member senate district, and five
multi-member house districts. The Court held that challengers to a
redistricting plan must prove the following three threshold conditions: (1)
that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district;" (2) that it is "politically
cohesive;" and (3) that, in the absence of special circumstances, such as
incumbency, bloc voting by the white majority usually defeats the minority's
preferred candidate. 2
Once these three conditions are established, certain objective factors
must be considered by the court in determining whether, from the "totality
of the circumstances,"" a violation has occurred. 4  These totality factors
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
49. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). This is commonly referred to as Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended. Section 2 provides:
A violation of [Section 2] is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by [Section 2] in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
51. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
52. Id. at 50-51.
53. See id. at 43.
54. Id. at 46.
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include the following: (1) the extent of the history of official discrimination
touching on the class participation in the democratic process; (2) racially
polarized voting; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single-shot provisions,55 or other voting practices that enhance the opportu-
nity for discrimination; (4) denial of access to the candidate slating process
for members of the class; (5) the extent to which the members of the
minority group bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health which hinder effective participation; (6) whether
political campaigns have been characterized by racial appeal; (7) the extent
to which members of the protected class have been elected; (8) whether
there is a significant lack of responsiveness by elected officials to the
particularized needs of the minority group; and (9) whether the policy
underlying the use of the voting qualification, standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous. 6
This list is not exhaustive; other factors may be relevant, and it is not
necessary that all, or any number of factors, be proved. 7 Litigation under
Section 2 is highly fact-intensive, and must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 8 Therefore, for challengers to prevail on a vote dilution claim
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, they must ultimately show that
under the totality of the circumstances, the legislative redistricting scheme
"has the effect of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of the
protected [minority] class."'59
In addition to the availability of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as amended, to allow minorities such as Blacks and Hispanics to
challenge redistricting plans that dilute the relative strength of minority
55. Under single-shot voting, a voter may cast as many votes as there are candidates in
a pool, or the voters may choose to vote for a lesser number of candidates. This tends to
allow factions to target, or single-shot, particular candidates.
56. Id. at 44-45.
57. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45.
58. See id. at 46.
59. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993). As the cases noted below
demonstrate, implicit concerns in the vote dilution analysis include packing and fracturing
of a cohesive minority group. "Packing" is the concentration of a minority group into one
or more districts so that the group constitutes an overwhelming majority in those districts,
thereby negating the relative voting strength of a percentage of the total minority vote.
Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1093 (N.D. III. 1982). "Fracturing"
is the breaking off of small percentages of a bloc of minority voters for inclusion in a large
majority district, thereby submerging the minority vote in the majority district. Gingles v.
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voters, there is another provision of the Voting Rights Act which has
vitalized the federal government's role in monitoring state governments'
regulation of the election process, including the redistricting process:
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.6"
Section 2 applies to all jurisdictions by prohibiting states or political
subdivisions from imposing any voting practice or procedure that dilutes the
voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities, regardless of intent to
discriminate. Section 5, however, applies only to specified jurisdictions,
requiring them to be precleared by either the Department of Justice (DOJ)
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, by showing
that any election practice or procedure affecting them does not have the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote of a racial or
ethnic minority group.6
In addition to voting strength equality and minority vote dilution
considerations, the Federal Constitution also makes political gerrymandering
a justiciable issue.62 Thus, if a redistricting plan, by arbitrarily arranging
district boundaries so as to give undue advantage to one political group over
another, thereby preventing the adversely affected group from improving its
standing in elections, consigns that group to minority status during the life
of the redistricting plan, or provides that group with little or no chance of
improving its position at the next redistricting, that plan is subject to legal
challenge.63 Other factors recognized by the United States Supreme Court
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
61. Since redistricting is a voting procedure which must be precleared as to covered
'jurisdictions, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the redistricting plans for
state legislative seats are required to pass the preclearance procedure before they can become
effective in those covered jurisdictions. Five Florida counties-Collier, Hardee, Hendry,
Hillsborough and Monroe-were included in 1975 amendments to the Act as covered
jurisdictions because of their use of English-only election materials that discriminated against
voters with a dominant language other than English. A redistricting plan must be precleared
as to these five counties only. Other changes include, but are not limited to: (1) any change
in qualifications or eligibility for voting; (2) changes concerning registration; (3) changes
involving the use of a language other than English in any aspect of the electoral process; (4)
changes in the boundaries of voting precincts or in the location of polling places; (5) changes
in the boundaries of a voting unit (through redistricting, annexation, incorporation,
reapportionment, changing to at-large elections from district elections or vice-versa); (6)
changes in the method of determining the outcome of an election; (7) changes affecting the
eligibility of persons to become or remain a candidate; and (8) changes in the eligibility and
qualification for independent candidates. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (1992).
62. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986).
63. A plan that purports to save as many incumbents of a political party as possible at
the expense of opposing party candidates is susceptible to a charge of political gerry-
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as legitimate considerations in the redistricting process include respecting
local boundaries, making districts compact, preserving the cores of existing
districts by not unnecessarily dividing them, and avoiding contests between
incumbents.64 Compactness generally refers to districts that are regular in
shape, having no unnecessary bulges or protrusions. The emphasis on
compactness is on eliminating distance variations for constituents and candi-
dates. These principles are not found in the state or Federal Constitution;65
however, they are important, along with the other redistricting principles,
because they may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been racially
gerrymandered.66 Implicit in the application of these time-tested principles
of redistricting is the view that those who are contained within a district
share a commonality of ideas and beliefs, and that any plan that may disrupt
this putative cohesiveness, such as splitting boundaries or pitting incumbents
against one another, is to be treated with skepticism.
2. Procedural Requirements
The Florida Constitution contemplates that redistricting will be
accomplished by joint resolution by the end of the regular legislative
session.67  This happened only once, however, in 1972. Under the
constitutional scheme, if a plan is adopted by the end of the regular session,
the Attorney General of Florida then has fifteen days to petition the supreme
court for a declaratory judgment ruling on the validity of the plan.6' The
supreme court then has up to thirty days to both permit adversary interests
to submit their views and to enter its judgment.69 If the court disapproves
the plan adopted during the regular session, the Governor has up to five
days to convene by proclamation an extraordinary session of the Legislature,
mandering. The evidentiary burden, however, is the high intent standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
64. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983). The desire to protect
incumbents, however, must not take precedence over the voting potential of a protected
minority group. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
65. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973).
66. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 725.
67. FLA. CONST. art. IlI, § 16(a).
68. Id. § 16(c).
69. Id. If approved, the plan becomes law, "binding upon all the citizens of the state,"
id. § 16(d), subject to review by the United States Attorney General under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1975), which requires preclearance as described
above, and subject to the court's retained jurisdiction.
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which has up to fifteen days to adopt a valid plan. 0 If a plan is adopted,
the Attorney General has fifteen days to submit it to the court, which has
thirty days to permit adversary interests to present their views and to enter
its judgment.71 If the plan is disapproved following an extraordinary
session, the court has sixty days from the submission by the Attorney
General to draw up a plan.72 If no plan is adopted by the Legislature
during the extraordinary apportionment session, the Attorney General has
fifteen days to so inform the court,73 which then has sixty days to draw up
its own plan.74
If the Legislature is unable to adopt a redistricting plan during its
regular session, the Governor has thirty days to convene a special apportion-
ment session by proclamation, giving the Legislature an additional thirty
days to adopt a plan.75 If no plan is adopted, the Attorney General has
five days from adjournment of that session to inform the court, which then
has sixty days to adopt its own plan.76
Thus, while the Legislature is given the first opportunity to establish
a redistricting plan, there are three instances in which the supreme court
may exercise this power: (1) when the Legislature fails to adopt a plan by
the end of a special apportionment session; (2) when the Legislature fails to
adopt a plan by the end of the extraordinary apportionment session; and (3)
when the court invalidates the legislative joint resolution adopted during an
extraordinary apportionment session.77
III. THE CONSTITUTION IN OPERATION
A. 1972
The first opportunity for article III, section 16's operation took place
70. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(d).
71. Id. § 16(e).
72. Id. § 16(f).
73. Id. § 16(e).
74. Id. § 16(f).
75. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a). This 30-day period cannot be limited by the Gover-
nor, who may use his discretion only in deciding when this special session will begin, which
must be within 30 days after adjournment of the regular session. Florida Senate v. Graham,
412 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1982). Only apportionment may be considered during this special
apportionment session. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 16(a).
76. Id. § 16(b).
77. 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 672 (West 1991) (annot. to FLA. CONST. art III, § 16).
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in 1972 when the Attorney General petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for
a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a joint legislative
resolution adopted during the regular session. In In re Apportionment Law
Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 Regular Session,7
the court held that its review of an apportionment plan is limited to facial
validity only,7 9 and declared both that legislative reapportionment is
primarily a matter for the Legislature,"° and that "[j]udicial relief becomes
appropriate only when a legislature fails to act according to federal and state
constitutional requisites."'" The court was called upon to address the
integrity of traditional boundary lines, population deviations and multi-mem-
ber districts-matters not found in the constitutional provision itself. The
court held that there is no requirement for legislative district lines to follow
county or precinct lines; the only requirement is that districts be either
"contiguous, overlapping or identical territory."82
As to population deviations, the court said:
The Constitutions of Florida and the United States require that one
man's vote in a district be worth as much as another. Mathematical
exactness is not an absolute requirement in state apportionment plans;
however, deviations, when unavoidable, must be de minimis. Whether
a deviation is de minimis must be determined on the facts of each
case.
83
The court noted that the total deviation for the House of Represen-
tatives was 0.30% while that of the Senate was 1.15%.84 The issue of
minority representation was addressed in connection with the legislative
decision to combine single- and multi-member districts in the redistricting
plan.
78. 263 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1972).
79. Id. at 808.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 800.
82. Id. at 801. Contiguity was not discussed during the 1972 process. It was not until
1982 that the court first addressed contiguity.
83. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972
Regular Session, 263 So. 2d at 802.
84. Id. As previously noted, to determine population deviation for legislative redistrict-
ing, it is first necessary to establish each district's ideal population. This is done by dividing
the total state population according to the official census by 40 (Senate) and 120 (House),
respectively. The deviation is the difference between the ideal population and a district's
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On multi-member districts, the court, after considering both article III,
section 16(a) and article III, section 1, which provides for the election of
one senator from each senatorial district and one representative from each
house district, held:
Construing these two sections together, the Constitution requires that
there be one senator elected from each Senatorial district and one
member of the House of Representatives elected from each representa-
tive district. This, standing alone, would require single-member
districts. However, the Constitution further provides that districts may
be "identical territory." This means that multi-members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives may be elected from identical territory
if such territory were designated as constituting several districts.85
Thus, the court concluded that multi-member districts are permissible
and may co-exist in the same plan with single-member districts. The court
found that the plan which divided Florida into 120 house districts of which
twenty-one were single-member, ten were two-member, nine were three-
member, twenty were four-member, thirty were five-member and thirty were
six-member; and into forty senate districts, of which five were single-memb-
er, fourteen were two-member, and twenty-one were three-member, was
reasonable and did not violate federal constitutional equal protection
requirements.86 The supreme court's 1972 decision did not end the matter,
for in its opinion, it set its precedent for retaining jurisdiction to permit
challengers to question the validity of the plan by presenting specific factual
objections to it.
The Constitution Revision Commission's desire to avoid proliferating
redistricting litigation was short-lived, as four supplemental proceedings
were filed with the supreme court, and a separate lawsuit was filed in
federal court in Jacksonville. Soon after the supreme court acted, suit was
filed in federal court both by plaintiffs who appeared before the supreme
85. Id. at 806-07. The court, in addressing claims of unreasonableness of classifications
of single-member and multi-member districts, said it "is not at liberty to declare the ... plan
void because it allegedly creates inconvenience, is unfair, or is inequitable, in the absence of
a violation of some provision of the constitution." Id. at 807. Multi-member districts are
those from which more than one legislator is elected to represent the area. Single-member
districts are those from which only one legislator is elected. The latter is the more common;
Florida's Legislature is made up of single-member districts.
86. The state court did not address the United States Supreme Court's jaundiced view
of multi-member districting plans, namely that they generally pose greater threats to
minority-voter participation than do single-member districts. See Bums v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
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court and others who did not, claiming that portions of the redistricting plan
created impermissible racial and political gerrymandering.17  The federal
court, after dismissing plaintiffs who appeared in the supreme court for
impermissibly seeking to appeal a decision from the state's highest court,
found that the remaining plaintiffs, claiming a one person, one vote
violation, failed to meet the high evidentiary burden of intentional discrimi-
nation, proof of discriminatory effect on and actual prejudice to-identifiable
racial or political segments of voters, or racial gerrymandering."8 A year
later, the supreme court held that the legislative plan was not shown to be
unconstitutional in its implementation on a claim that it deprived citizens of
Lee County of meaningful senatorial representation by the fact that no
candidate from that county entered any of the primary elections for seats in
the senate in any of the four districts which cut across Lee County lines.89
In another proceeding, the supreme court rejected a claim that the redistrict-
ing plan left voters in Neptune Beach and Jacksonville Beach without an
effective voice because the plan did not join these two communities. The
court concluded that the plan did not leave Neptune Beach officials without
any effective voice in the Legislature,, even though the plan assigned the
area to senate districts which did not include the consolidated city of
Jacksonville.9" These two cases involved local interests desirous of
obtaining a broader political power base through enhanced representation.
Several years after the 1972 redistricting process, the growing influence
of minorities manifested itself in redistricting challenges before the Florida
Supreme Court. In 1977, the court rejected claims by Dade County
Hispanics that their voting strength had been negated because of the large
influx of Hispanics into that area of the state, coupled with the fact that the
petitioners resided in multi-member districts. A bare majority of the court
held that it did not intend to retain jurisdiction over the 1972 plan in order
to continuously monitor changing racial, ethnic or population patterns. 9'
Finally, in a case that began in 1977 and concluded in 1980, the court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the multi-member house districts in
Pinellas County, Florida. 92 However, the court appointed a commissioner
to take evidence on the claim that the multi-member district constitutionally
impaired the voting strength of the racial or political composition of Pinellas
87. Wolfson v. Nearing, 346 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
88. Id. at 804.
89. In re Tohari, 279 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1973).
90. Futch v. Stone, 281 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1973).
91. Cardenas v. Smathers, 351 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1977).
92. Milton v. Smathers, 351 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1977).
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County. The commissioner's findings were reported to the court in 1980,
and the court denied relief.93
B. 1982
The 1982 Legislature, reflecting on a history of litigation characterizing
the redistricting process, approached its mandate from the standpoint of an
openness not previously seen in Florida.94 A House Select Committee on
Reapportionment was formed in 1980 to analyze case law on the subject and
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires federal preclearance,
or approval, of any plan that of necessity involves five of Florida's sixty-
seven counties, as a result of amendments adopted after the 1972 redistrict-
ing.95  This Select Committee conducted twenty-one public hearings
throughout the state from August to October, 1981.96 It considered
detailed population data, the dynamics of population growth particularly
with respect to minorities, and all criteria applicable to the process.
97
Additionally, the Select Committee actually sought and received interest
group input.98 The Legislature adopted the plan on April 7, 1982; 99 five
days later, the Attorney General submitted his petition.' 0 One month
later, the supreme court approved the plan.' The plan was then Submit-
ted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was received by the
state on August 5, 1982."02
The 1982 redistricting effort is noted for five precedent-setting actions.
93. Milton v. Smathers, 389 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1980). After conducting fact-finding
proceedings, the commissioner found that the multi-member districts did not unconstitutional-
ly impair the voting strength of the district's Black population. The supreme court's decision
was based on the absence of evidence of intent to discriminate-the critical element in
proving a fourteenth amendment violation. Indeed, all of the cases based on the 1972
redistricting process were reviewed under this "intent to discriminate" standard. As shown
below, a change in this standard of proof coupled with United States Supreme Court and
Department of Justice involvement, paved the way for further and more intensive litigation
culminating in the 1992 experience.
94. Mark Herron, An Overview of Florida's 1982 Reapportionment, FLORIDA
ENVIRONMENTAL AND URBAN ISSUES, Oct. 1982, at 5.




99. See Herron, supra note 94, at 5.
100. Id.
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First, the Legislature had to convene a special session to accomplish its
constitutional mandate. Second, the Legislature opted for single-member
districts for all forty Senate seats and all 120 House seats, adopting a
recommendation made by the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission." 3
The purpose of this shift was to lessen the prospects that minority groups'
voting strength would be negated as a result of the winner-take-all nature of
multi-member district elections.0 4 Third, the Select Committee defined
"contiguity."' 0 5 Fourth, detailed consideration was given to representation
for the Hispanic and Black population with de minimis population devia-
tion.106 Finally, a redistricting plan had to be submitted to the DOJ for
preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,
directed to the five counties brought under the law in 1975. °7
The Florida Supreme Court considered a contiguity challenge to one
house district in which challengers contended one portion was only touching
another portion and the constitution requires more.0 8 The court rejected
this challenge, holding that while lands mutually touching only at a common
comer or right angle are not contiguous, a district in which no part is
isolated from another by an intervening district is contiguous.0 9
The House plan provided seven districts with Hispanic population of
fifty-eight percent or higher and seven districts with Black population of
fifty-two percent or higher."0 The Senate plan had one district with a
Black population of sixty-five percent and two districts with Hispanic
population of fifty-five percent or higher."' The total deviation in
population among senate and house districts was 1.05% and 0.46%,
103. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a) provides for the creation of a constitution revision
commission 10 years after the adopting of the 1968 Constitution, and every 20 years
thereafter.
104. See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 1982).
105. Id. at 1051.
106. See Herron, supra note 94, at 7.
107. Id.
108. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1051.
109. Id. "Contiguous" means sharing a common boundary for a reasonable distance;
"overlapping" means that some parts of the districts are shared; "identical" applies when
districts follow the same lines, as in the case of multi-member districts where a house and
senate district may have the same lines or boundaries. Id.
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respectively.'1 2 The plan for senate districts maintained the boundary line
integrity of forty-five counties by not splitting them; the plan for house
districts maintained the integrity of twenty-six counties.113 In most
instances, county lines were split because population was greater than the
ideal number of people per district.'' 4
The Florida Supreme Court found no proof of purposeful discrimina-
tion.115 The court rejected claims that a district in Dade County had been
gerrymandered to the detriment of the Hispanic population, and that in Dade
County, districts should be redrawn to provide for a larger concentration of
Black voters." 6 The court recognized that challenges are cognizable under
the Fourteenth Amendment even though districts may be relatively equal in
population."' However, in citing to United States Supreme Court cases
decided after the 1972 Florida Supreme Court decision validating the 1972
redistricting plan, the court said:
We consider any minority challenge to the plan as raising an issue of
whether it invidiously discriminates against any minority group. To
show invidious discrimination, the objector to the plan for apportion-
ment must produce evidence which supports the finding that the
political process in this apportionment plan was a "purposefully
discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to
vote 'on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'
The objectors have the burden to show this Court that the plan was
motivated by an intent to discriminate." 8
The court concluded that the plan before it did "not invidiously
discriminate against any racial or language minority for the purpose of
minimizing or canceling the voting strength of either the Black or Hispanic
population in violation of either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments,
112. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1044.
113. Id. at 1045.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1052.
116. Id.
117. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution I E, Special
Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1052.
118. Id. (citations omitted). The court also decided that senators' four-year terms should
be truncated, there could be no "holdover" terms, and senators were required to run if, as a
result of redistricting, there is a change in district lines and constituency. Id. at 1047-48.
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In contrast to 1972, the openness of the 1982 process and the decision
to use single-member districts only (coupled with the high evidentiary
burden necessary to prove a constitutional violation), contributed to the least
contentious redistricting process in Florida's modern history.2 2 The
relative ease by which 1982 redistricting was accomplished and the lack of
any federal and supplemental state judicial activity is in stark contrast to
what transpired in 1992.121
C. 1992
The 1992 redistricting process was the end product of an unprecedented
population growth and a fundamental change in federal voting rights laws.
These two factors clashed with the state's traditional one-party domination
of Florida government to produce the most intense legislative district
realignment in the state's history, dominated by racial and ethnic minority
group efforts to secure a greater piece of the state's political power pie.
According to the 1990 census, the state's population increased during
the last decade by more than thirty percent, to just under thirteen million,
from a previous 9.7 million. 122 A substantial portion of this phenomenal
growth resulted from the immigration of Hispanics from Central and South
America. Nowhere was this growth more evident than in heavily populated
Dade County. As the number of Hispanics mushroomed, they became
increasingly active both civically and politically in their new community.
They registered, voted, campaigned for, sought and won election to office
as Republicans in what was historically a firmly entrenched Democratic
Party stronghold.
The second significant change involved the amendments to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.123 The amendments altered the method by which a
minority group could show a voting practice or procedure, including a
redistricting plan, thereby violating its right to fair and equal participation
119. Id. at 1052 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
120. Critics accused the 1972 Legislature leadership of adopting a "secret plan." Herron,
supra note 94, at 6-7.
121. As in 1972, the supreme court retained exclusive state jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the 1982 plan. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution
I E, Special Apportionment Session, 414 So. 2d at 1052.
122. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d 276, 289 (Fla. 1992).
123. Id. at 280.
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in the electoral process. 24  As noted above, this change in the legal
standard took place at a time of rapid increase in the Hispanic population,
particularly in the multicultural population-intense counties of Dade and
Hillsborough. These factors, coupled with the rise of the Republican Party
in what was traditionally a one-party state, and the enhanced overall
consciousness of minority rights generally, set the stage for 1992's
redistricting efforts dominated by politics, race and ethnicity.
The battle lines for the 1992 redistricting effort were drawn along
political, racial and ethnic lines toward a common goal: the exercise of
political power and influence. In addition to the clamor for access to and
exercise of political power during this most contentious redistricting cycle,
underlying tensions surfaced between Blacks and Hispanics, particularly in
Dade County. 2 '
Legislative leaders anticipated heightened activity, particularly by
minorities during the 1992 legislative session. Reflecting on the 1982
experience, the leaders began preparing for the session four years earlier.
The House and Senate each hired separate expert technical staffs and
provided them with state-of-the-art computer systems. Reapportionment
committees were appointed in 1991 for the House and Senate, and both
chambers hosted thirty-two public hearings throughout the state between
September and December, 1991. The purpose of the hearings was to
provide for unfettered citizen involvement in the development of a
constitutional redistricting plan, and to educate the public on the subject and
its process. '26
On January 14, the first day of the 1992 Florida legislative session,
Miguel DeGrandy filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the constitu-
tionality of Florida's then-existing congressional and state legislative
districts."2 7 DeGrandy, a Republican member of the Florida House of
Representatives from Dade County, joined with party leaders, other Republi-
can legislators and voters, in naming as defendants the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, T. K. Wetherell, the President of the Florida Senate,
124. Id.
125. In Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1481 (11th Cir. 1993),
involving a Voting Rights Act claim that the at-large county commission election districts
dilute the voting strength of Blacks and Hispanics, the appeals court found that a district
court's finding of a "keen hostility" between Blacks and Hispanics in Dade County is not
clearly erroneous.
126. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 278.
127. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1554 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
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Gwen Margolis, the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State. 128
The Complaint alleged that the then-existing congressional and state districts
violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amend-
ed. 12
9
After preliminary procedural skirmishes, DeGrandy filed a Second
Amended Complaint on March 9th 3' further alleging that the then-existing
congressional and legislative districts violated Article I, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution and the "one-person, one-vote" principle, and that
since the former districts diluted the voting strength of minority voters, they
violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.' 3 ' DeGrandy also
alleged that the Florida Legislature was at an impasse and therefore unable
to act; that the time frame for redistricting set forth in the Florida Constitu-
tion, article III, section 16, in light of the preclearance requirements of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, would not provide for sufficient time
to adopt a valid redistricting plan for the State Legislature and that therefore
this provision was unconstitutional; 3 2 and that the democratic leadership,
the Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, and Governor, "intention-
ally misused the time lines and procedures found in Article III ... to delay
the redistricting process to the advantage of white (democratic) incumbents
and to the detriment of voters and would-be challengers to those incum-
bents."' 33
On March 13, the Florida Legislature adjourned its regular session
without adopting a state redistricting plan.' 34 Two weeks later, the federal
court established an expedited schedule for adoption of both congressional
and state legislative plans by May 29.'3 However, the court's order did
not prohibit state officials from attempting to enact a redistricting plan.'
136
On April 2, the Governor called a special redistricting and apportionment
session of the Florida Legislature pursuant to article III, section 16(a) of the
Florida Constitution. Eight days later, the Legislature adopted Senate Joint
Resolution 2(3 redistricting both houses of the Legislature.'37
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Specific dates are included here to demonstrate the intensity of the litigation.
131. Id.
132. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1554. The federal court never ruled on this claim.




137. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555.
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Four days before the Legislature adopted a redistricting plan, the
federal court appointed a special master.3 ' On April 7, the court consoli-
dated the DeGrandy case with a similar lawsuit filed by the Florida State
Conference of the NAACP Branches and other individual African-American
voters. 39  The court also granted other persons and entities leave to
intervene or act as amicus curiae."'
On April 17, the Florida Attorney General submitted Senate Joint
Resolution 2G to the DOJ for preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.'4 ' That same day, the three-judge federal court
ordered bifurcated hearings on congressional redistricting and state
redistricting plans. 42 Meanwhile, three days after the April 10 legislative
adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, the Florida Attorney General
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment determining
the validity of the joint resolution.' 43 Before the supreme court, the
proponents of the senate joint resolution contended that because the court's
analysis is directed solely to facial constitutional validity of the legislation,
the court could not address the complex evidentiary standard imposed on
those who challenge a redistricting plan under the Voting Rights Act.'
Opponents of the senate joint resolution, also the intervenors to the
federal court litigation, contended that the supreme court could not fulfill its
duty without conducting a time-consuming analysis under the Voting Rights
Act-an impossible burden in light of time constraints on campaigning and
elections.'45 The opponents further requested that the court declare the





142. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555. The adoption of a congressional redistricting
plan is accomplished in the same manner as the adoption of any piece of Legislation-appro-
val by both houses of the Legislature and subject to gubernatorial veto. In 1992, the
Legislature was unable to adopt a congressional redistricting plan; therefore, the federal court
undertook the task and appointed a special master, who presided over a trial and prepared a
report. After receiving the special master's report on congressional redistricting, and con-
ducting hearings on his findings and conclusions, the federal court, on May 29, issued its
judgment adopting a congressional redistricting plan. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp.
1076, 1081 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
143. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 278.
144. Id. at 281-82.
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disregard the thirty-day requirement of the Florida Constitution redistricting
provision and refer the case to a judge or master to conduct the necessary
fact-finding analysis contemplated by the Voting Rights Act or withhold
ruling and defer to the federal court action.' 47
The supreme court rejected the view that it could not conduct a Voting
Rights Act analysis in evaluating the validity of the plan. 4 ' The court,
while recognizing the impossibility of conducting "the complete factual
analysis contemplated by the Voting Rights Act . . . ," nevertheless
analyzed all of the statistical data filed by the parties. This data included
the breakdown of White, Black, and Hispanic voting-age populations and
voting registrations."' The court then analyzed numerous legislative
districts contained in Senate Joint Resolution 2G, particularly Hispanic and
Black majority districts, and concluded that the plan was valid. 5 ' Howev-
er, as in the past, the court retained exclusive jurisdiction to provide "any
interested person ...the opportunity to attempt to prove that the Joint
Resolution is invalid through a presentation of evidence in accordance with
the Gingles analysis of the Voting Rights Act."'5 2  Should such an
opportunity be sought, the court provided "for an expedited disposition
through the appointment of a commissioner to make findings of fact.""'
The supreme court's validation of the plan took place over a vigorous
dissent by Chief Justice Shaw, who found the redistricting plan invalid
under the Voting Rights Act.
154
When considering total population, the legislatively adopted plan
included thirteen Black majority population house districts and three Black
influence districts in which minority population exceeded twenty-five
percent but was less than fifty percent. 55 The plan also provided for two
Black majority population senate districts (both in Dade County) and three
147. Id.
148. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 282.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 285.
152. Id.
153. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 286. This is what the supreme court did in Milton v. Smathers,
351 So. 2d 24- (Fla. 1977).
154. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 287-93 (much of Chief Justice Shaw's analysis is found in the
federal court's decision).
155. Id. at 282.
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Black influence districts with minority population ranging from twenty-eight
percent to forty-nine percent. 156 With regard to Hispanic representation,
the court noted that the plan provided for nine majority house districts and
seven intfluence districts, the latter ranging in population from twenty-six
percent to forty-six percent.'57 The plan created three Hispanic majority
senate districts.'58 When voting-age population is considered, the joint
resolution provided for eleven Black majority and two influence districts in
the House, and two majority and one influence district in the Senate.'59
The court noted that the 1982 plan contained seven Black house
districts, seven majority Hispanic districts, "only 1" Black majority senate
district and "only 2" Hispanic majority senate districts. 6  The court ob-
served that the 1992 plan was accomplished with maximum population
deviations of 1.99 percent in the house districts and 0.87 percent in the
senate districts, and thus concluded "[t]he 1992 plan is a material improve-
ment over conditions under the 1982 plan ...and provides a substantial
opportunity for minorities to influence elections and elect representatives of
their choice.'
6 1
These findings did not satisfy the objectors, however, who, although
given the opportunity to press their specific voting rights claims before the
supreme court, 62 never did. Instead, the objectors engaged in unsuccess-
ful efforts to remove the supreme court proceedings to federal court and
thereby ousted the supreme court of its jurisdiction.'63  The parties
returned to the supreme court only to address the Section 5 objection by the
Justice Department. The objectors to the joint resolution wanted to wage
their fight in federal court to create more minority districts. 64
The Florida Supreme Court also had occasion to address contiguity for
156. Id. at 283. An influence district is one in which a minority, while it may not be
able to elect a candidate outright, nevertheless has a sizeable enough population to influence
the outcome of the election, when the minority vote is added to the non-minority crossover
vote. Id. at 282-83 n.8.
157. Id. at 283.
158. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 283.
159. Id. at 282-83.
160. Id. at 284.
161. Id. at 285.
162. Id. at 285-86.
163. DeGrandy Plaintiffs' Petition for Removal, DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1550.
164. As demonstrated by the voluminous filings in DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1550.
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the second time.'65 Four senate districts were challenged because, as a
result of the lack of roads or the presence of bodies of water without
connecting bridges, travel throughout these four districts could not be
accomplished without crossing into another district.' 66 The court held that
these districts are contiguous because "[c]ontiguity does not impose a
requirement of a paved, dry road connecting all parts of a district."'
16 7
The supreme court's decision was issued on May 13. On May 27, the
federal court held a hearing on all pending motions, including those
designed to set trial on legislative redistricting, as well as those designed to
secure the federal court's deference to the state legislative and judicial
review process.'68 At that hearing, the federal court learned from the DOJ
that it probably would issue its preclearance decision by June 17, 1992.169
On June 16, the DOJ issued its preclearance decision, emphasizing that
its Section 5 review addressed the plans only insofar as the five preclearance
counties (Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough and Monroe) were
affected. 7 ' The Attorney General of the United States did not interpose
any objections to the redistricting plan for the House of Representatives.' 7'
The DOJ, however, refused to preclear the Senate Plan stating:
With regard to the Hillsborough County area, the state has chosen to
draw its senatorial districts such that there are no districts in which
minority persons constitute a majority of the voting age population. To
accomplish this result, the state chose to divide the politically cohesive
minority populations in the Tampa and St. Petersburg areas. Alternative
plans were presented to the legislature uniting the Tampa and St.
Petersburg minority populations in order to provide minority voters an
effective opportunity to elect their preferred candidate to the State
Senate .... [T]he information before us, including the economic and
other ties between Tampa and St. Petersburg, as well as the political
cohesiveness of minority voters in those two cities, demonstrates that
the two areas do share a commonality of interest. Finally, we have
examined evidence, including evidence in the legislative record, which
suggests that the state's approach to senatorial redistricting in the
165. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment
Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 279.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555.
169. Id.
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Hillsborough area was undertaken with an intent to protect incumbents.
Such a rationale, of course, cannot justify the treatment of minority
voters in this area by the State Senate plan. 7
2
At the request of the Attorney General of Florida, the supreme court
set an expedited schedule to address the Justice Department's objections to
the Senate plan.' 73 In its order of June 17, 1992, the supreme court
encouraged the Legislature to adopt a proper plan, taking into consideration
the Justice Department objections. 174  The supreme court cautioned that
if the Legislature declared its inability to adopt a plan, or failed to adopt a
plan by June 24, 1992, the court would conclude that the Legislature is at
an impasse, upon which the court would accomplish the task. 7 ' The su-
preme court also set out an abbreviated schedule within which redistricting
action had to be taken.'76 On the following day, House Speaker Wetherell
and Senate President Margolis informed the supreme court of their decision
not to convene their respective chambers in an extraordinary apportionment
session.'77 The court was also informed that the Governor did not intend
to convene the Legislature.77 As a result, the supreme court declared a
legislative impasse and adopted an amended schedule. 179
Meanwhile, plaintiffs in the federal court action, upon notice of the
DOJ's refusal to preclear the Senate plan, immediately asked that forum to
establish a scheduling order and set the matter for trial on legislative
redistricting, and filed yet another Amended Complaint contending that the
joint resolution itself violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'"0
Thus, rather than litigating Section 2 claims in the supreme court pursuant
to its retained jurisdiction, objectors to the plan opted for federal court
involvement.
Challengers to the plan raised jurisdictional questions both in the
supreme court and federal court.' 8' The Florida Supreme Court, address-
172. Id. (quoting letter from John Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, United States Department of Justice, to Robert A. Butterworth, Florida Attorney
General (June 16, 1992)).





178. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1556.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1558.
181. Id. at 1557.
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ing the questions, said:
The reapportionment of state legislative bodies is not a power delegated
by the Constitution of the United States to the federal government.
Under the provisions of the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, this is a power reserved to states. Of course, this Court
is obligated to apply any applicable federal constitutional provisions and
any federal statutes implementing these provisions.
The Florida Constitution places upon this Court the responsibility to
review state legislative reapportionment. Art. 1I, § 16, Fla. Const.
Pursuant to that authority, we approved the original legislative reappor-
tionment and retained jurisdiction to entertain subsequent objections
thereto. Consistent with the provisions of art. II, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution, we believe that it is our obligation to redraw the
plan to satisfy the objection of the Justice Department now that the
Legislature has declared that it is not going to do so.' 82
On June 25,, the supreme court adopted, as a cure for the portion of the plan
rejected by the DOJ, a proposal submitted by certain African-American
parties.'83
Two days before the supreme court issued its curative decision, the DOJ
filed its own lawsuit in federal court against the State of Florida and several
elected officials,' 84 contending that the redistricting plans diluted the
voting strength of African-American and Hispanic citizens in several areas
of the state in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,'85 and that
the state's proposed Senate plan for the Hillsborough County area divides
the politically cohesive minority population in the Tampa and St. Petersburg
areas, such as there are no senatorial districts in which minority persons
constitute a majority of the voting age population.' 86
182. Id. (citing In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special
Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 1992)).
183. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1557 (citing In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So. 2d at 546). The remedial plan
selected was the one submitted to the supreme court by the Humphrey-Reaves plaintiffs.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1557-58.
186. Id. at 1558. The DOJ expressed its view that the supreme court's modification for
the Hillsborough County area satisfied its Section 5 objection. However, the Department did
not officially preclear the modification decision. Accordingly, the three-judge court adopted
the supreme court's modification as its own for Section 5 purposes, thereby precluding the
need for Justice Department preclearance. Id. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978),
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The DOJ's lawsuit was consolidated with DeGrandy's action."8 7
DeGrandy was then permitted to amend his Complaint to allege Section 2
violations as to Senate Joint Resolution 2G as now modified.' On June
26, the federal court, one day after the supreme court adopted its remedy for
the Justice Department's objection, commenced trial which lasted five days,
through July 1. During the trial, the parties entered into a consent decree
with respect to the Escambia County portion of the lawsuit by redrawing the
Escambia County house districts to provide for greater African-American
participation.'89 The agreement on Escambia County was reached after the
court ruled from the bench that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case
on a constitutional violation of intentional discrimination in Escambia
County.'90
On July 1, after testimony and argument had been concluded, the court
ruled from the bench that, with respect to the Senate plan, although the
plaintiffs demonstrated that a fourth Hispanic district can be drawn in the
Dade County (South Florida) area, they failed to prove that a fourth
Hispanic district can be drawn without creating a regressive effect upon
African-American voters in the same area.' 9 ' Therefore, the federal court
was required to give deference to the state policy as expressed in the Florida
plan, Senate Joint Resolution 2G as modified, and ultimately approved by
the supreme court.
19 2
With respect to the House plan, the federal court took note that the
Senate Joint Resolution created thirteen minority-majority districts of which
nine had Hispanic voting-age population supermajority districts and four had
African-American voting age population majority districts. 93 The De-
Grandy plan, as modified during the trial, provided for eleven Hispanic
south Florida districts of supermajority proportion, each containing no less
than sixty-three percent Hispanic voting age population.'94 The modified
DeGrandy plan also provided for four African-American districts containing
holds that a court-adopted plan does not require preclearance by the DOJ under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 540.
187. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1558.
188. Id at 1559.
189. Id. at 1560.
190. Id. Only plaintiff-intervenor Daryl Reaves, a member of the State House, was not
a party to the Escambia County consent decree. Id.
191. DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1560.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1580.
194. Id. at 1581.
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Black voting-age population percentages of no less than fifty-five per-
cent. '95
The federal court concluded that only the modified DeGrandy plan was
acceptable under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'96 By its action, the
federal court thus concluded--contrary to the supreme court's view that the
joint resolution represented a significant improvement for minorities over
1982-that because four Hispanic senate seats (instead of the Legislature's
three) and eleven Hispanic house seats (instead of the Legislature's nine)
could have been created for the Dade County area, the state plan ipsofacto
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the modified DeGrandy
plan would be used for the 1993 elections.
Immediately thereafter, the government defendants applied for a stay
from the United States Supreme Court as to the federal court's decision on
the House plan. Upon application to that Court, the federal district court's
House plan with respect to Dade County was stayed.'97 Accordingly,
when the 1992 elections were held for the Florida Legislature, the plan
adopted by the Florida Legislature, as modified and approved by the
supreme court, was the plan used for those elections. The three-judge court
decision is before the United States Supreme Court in the form of three
separate appeals which have been consolidated for briefing, argument and
disposition.
In its appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the House of
Representatives contends that the federal court's plan constitutes maximiza-
tion'98 of electoral opportunities in violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act because the legislative plan already provides that minorities have
the opportunity to elect candidates in numbers essentially equal to the
minorities' percentages of the population. The House further contends that
the district court erred by not abstaining and deferring to the state constitu-
tional process, contending that the state supreme court is the proper forum
to address redistricting concerns. Finally, the House maintains that the
remedy imposed by the court is flawed in that the court relied on erroneous
population data by considering Hispanic non-citizens in the voting-age
195. Id. Unlike the joint resolution, the modified DeGrandy plan reached beyond Dade
County and into neighboring counties. See DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1581.
196. Id. at 1582.
197. Wetherell v. DeGrandy, 113 S. Ct. 1 (1992) (order of the United States Supreme
Court granting stay).
198. Maximization means drawing the greatest, or maximum, number of majority
minority districts and that the failure to do so constitutes a Voting Rights Act violation.
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population equation.' 99
The DeGrandy plaintiffs contend that the federal court erred by not
providing a complete remedy once it found a violation of Section 2 with
respect to the Senate redistricting plan.2°° The DOJ appeal is essentially
similar to that presented by the DeGrandy plaintiffs.2"'
A reading of the chronology of events pertaining to legislative
redistricting, as contained in the two Florida Supreme Court decisions and
the federal district court decision, provides the flavor of political, racial and
ethnic battles that overshadowed redistricting during 1992. During the
litigation before the two judicial forums, there was much talk about the
unusual alliance forged between Blacks and Hispanics, particularly since it
was understood among insiders that Hispanics, who generally vote
republican in Dade County, were in actuality seeking to sever Black voters
from traditional democratic jurisdictions and place them into their own
majority districts, thereby giving Hispanic Republicans a greater opportunity
to elect Republicans in those now-diluted democrat districts.
Because the primacy of racial and ethnic representation mandated by
federal law transcended all of the other factors that inhere to redistricting,
district compactness took on an "Alice in Wonderland" reality. Odd-shaped,
elongated, snake-like, Rorschach ink-blot district lines drawn to accommo-
date racial and ethnic population patterns were nevertheless deemed compact
because these districts-regardless of shape-represented an identifiable
community and constituency.
The vitality of these odd-shaped districts drawn to accommodate
minority representation is suspect as a result of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno.2"2 Shaw involved the drawing of a
redistricting plan for North Carolina by the Legislature in response to a
Section 5 objection by the United States Attorney General.0 3  White
residents challenged a portion of this plan creating a congressional district
that, for the most part, was no wider than the Interstate 85 corridor, and
drawn to create a black-majority district.20 4
The Court held that the residents stated a justiciable claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, holding that "a plaintiff challenging a reapportion-
ment statute under [this clause] may state a claim by alleging that the
199. See House of Representatives Brief, DeGrandy,815 F. Supp. at 1550 (No. 92-519).
200. DeGrandy v. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. 2438 (1993).
201. United States v. Florida, 113 S. Ct. 2438 (1993).
202. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
203. Id. at 2819.
204. Id. at 2820.
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legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood
as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on
the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.""2 5
The emphasis of this decision is that traditional notions of compactness will
not be sacrificed solely for racial purposes in the absence of "sufficient
justification. 2 °6
It is risky indeed to attempt to predict the outcome of a case pending
before the United States Supreme Court. However, it is evident from the
redistricting decisions issued during the 1992-93 term that the Court is
protective of the traditional deference accorded the state in the exercise of
its redistricting responsibilities,2 °7 while frowning upon the creation of
districts solely for racial purposes.20 8
The most significant issue now before the Court concerns maximization
of minority districts. 2 9  In light of Shaw v. Reno, and since the Voting
Rights Act specifically provides that there is no right to proportional
representation for minority groups, 210 it appears the Court will reject the
notion that the Act requires the creation of the maximum number of
minority districts, however configured. Race and ethnicity will remain
factors to be considered in the redistricting process, along with other
traditional considerations (compactness, respecting existing boundaries, etc.);
however, race and ethnicity will not be exclusive factors, at least in the
absence of a clear showing of a constitutional violation.
The bottom line, however, is that the Voting Rights Act and population
dynamics together fired a political power struggle that led to the most
divisive redistricting process in Florida's history. As a result of this divisive
205. Id. at 2828.
206. Id. at 2826. While the Voting Rights Act will not permit a redistricting plan "so
highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to segregat[e] ... voters on the basis of race." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (quoting
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). The use of bizarre districting is not
precluded by this decision, or Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27 (1971). The Court, in dealing with a long history
of state-imposed unconstitutional school discrimination, approved "a frank-and sometimes
drastic-gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones," resulting in "zones [that]
are neither compact nor contiguous; indeed they may be on opposite ends of the city." Id.
Thus, it appears the Constitution permits what the Voting Rights Act does not; traditional
notions of compactness may be sacrificed to remedy a constitutional violation, but not to
remedy a statutory infirmity.
207. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993).
208. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
209. See DeGrandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1550.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(e) (1988).
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process, proposals were submitted to the Legislature in 1993 by Democrats
and Republicans, Blacks and Hispanics alike, to either remove the Legisla-
ture entirely from the districting process or otherwise involve another entity
in it.
IV. A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE?
In a concurring opinion in In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992,21 Justice Ben
Overton suggested that a 1978 Constitution Revision Commission proposal
calling for the creation of a Reapportionment Commission, and providing
for specific redistricting standards be reexamined for placement on the
ballot.212 One legislative proposal submitted in 1993 called for the
creation of a commission consisting of seven members, none of whom may
be elected public officials, party officers, registered lobbyists or legislative
employees. Six would be selected by the chief justice of the supreme court,
five of whom must be selected from recommendations made by the chief
judge of the five district courts of appeal. Each chief judge would
recommend three individuals who met the qualifications set out above. The
chief justice would appoint at least one member of each racial or language
minority group that comprised ten percent of the population of the state as
shown by the most recent federal decennial census.
The chiefjustice would be authorized to disregard the recommendations
if they did not permit such appointments. Within thirty days after the
appointments were made, the six commissioners would have to select by
majority vote of at least four, a seventh commissioner who would serve as
chair. The Commission would be authorized to hold hearings and to take
action in accordance with specific reapportionment standards. Once the
Commission completed its plan, it would file it with the Secretary of State,
and within fifteen days of that filing, the Attorney General would petition
the supreme court for its approval. Another proposal called for the creation
of a commission to undertake the task in the event the Legislature fails to
fulfill its redistricting obligation.
In Florida, as in most states, it is the Legislature that is called upon
initially to undertake the redistricting process. The stark reality of this fact
is that legislators, with an eye to their political careers, are expected to rise
above partisan politics and pragmatic self-survival by fairly and lawfully
211. 597 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1992).
212. Id. at 286.
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redistricting-even at their own expense.
It appears to have taken three redistricting cycles for some of Florida's
political leaders (and the people they represent) to address whether it may
be asking too much for our legislators to redistrict, as constitutionally
required, without concern for political survival. No doubt the suggested
shift to a commission is reflective of this political reality. By operation of
article XI, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, a constitution revision
commission will be established in 1998. Perhaps Florida voters will have
a chance to consider at that time whether the current method of redistricting,
with its political storm and stress, should give way to an alternative
approach.
Whether a commission approach is more appealing in light of the
political exigencies involved in the appointment process remains to be seen.
The fact of the matter is that the Legislature apparently wants to avoid
putting itself and the citizens of the state through another contentious,
hostile redistricting process, a process that historically is steeped in
litigation.
Perhaps, after more than thirty years of redistricting litigation,
representation percentages are such as to provide all citizens with a fair,
level playing field where each group has equal opportunity to participate in,
and realize the fruits of, the political process. If this is so, 213 then perhaps
contentious, protracted litigation will be relegated to history.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of redistricting litigation in Florida exemplifies the shifting
political sands from rural to urban concentration, coupled with rapid
Hispanic migration and the rise of minority influence in tandem with a
change in federal law protective of minority rights. In hindsight, it was
inevitable that, by casting the judiciary into the political thicket of
apportionment and redistricting, this most fundamental process in a
democratic form of government would become steeped in political power
entanglements in which the federal courts would be regarded as the ultimate
referee.
The state constitutional process under article III, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution was born of, and nurtured by, litigation over the
213. The Florida Supreme Court specifically found that the redistricting plan afforded
minorities fair and substantial political opportunity. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So. 2d at 285.
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ultimate exercise of political power, predominantly by Blacks and Hispanics
seeking a greater voice in the democratic process by resorting to remedies
provided by changing federal law. The intensity of the conflict in 1992 led
to a bipartisan move to change the present system. Whether change comes
about, and whether any change will be for the better, is speculative at best.
If there is a single message to be learned from Florida's redistricting
history under its constitution, it is that as the voices of minority groups grow
louder, so will their insistence on a correspondingly greater voice in the
exercise of political power. The overriding goal is fairness-a level playing
field where all participants have a voice, the strength of which is unrestrict-
ed by racial or ethnic status alone. Perhaps the most recent litigation
experience achieves this laudable end; only the ameliorative effect of time
will tell. If, however, this goal remains unattainable in the minds of some,
then intensely litigating future redistricting efforts, even to the point of using
increased minority group leverage to further a political party's personal
agenda, looms on the horizon.
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